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The coherence of probability judgments
is influenced in predictable ways by peo-
ple’s internal representations of problems,
which may be altered by the manner in
which propositions are stated or “framed”
(Mandel, 2008). Likewise, several studies
find that probabilistic reasoning and judg-
ment can be improved by externally repre-
senting statistical information visually (for
a review, see Garcia-Retamero and Cokely,
2013). Visual representation is thought
to facilitate performance by externalizing
the set-subset relations among observa-
tional data. Although some studies have
examined whether visual representations
can improve Bayesian reasoning, they have
tended to focus on the use of natural
sampling trees (Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer,
2001), Euler circles (Sloman et al., 2003),
or other means of representing set-subset
relations.
However, visualization can aid reason-
ing and judgment even when problems
do not involve natural or normalized fre-
quency representations. Take the “Ann
problem” adapted by Over (2007b):
Jack is looking at Ann but Ann is looking
at George. Jack is a cheater but George
is not. Is a cheater looking at a non-
cheater?
(A) Yes (B) No (C) Cannot tell
In a variant of the problem, Toplak and
Stanovich (2002) found that most people
say they cannot tell, although the correct
answer is yes. Wrong answers are common
because most people do not consider the
implications of the fact that Ann is either
a cheater or she is not. As Over (2007b)
notes, the logic of the excluded middle—
namely, that all propositions of the form
“x or not-x” are logically true—is often
neglected.
Instead people seem to be guided by
their sense of uncertainty about both of the
dyadic relations in the problem, remain-
ing unaware that their uncertainty should
not preclude a more definite conclusion.
As Over (2007a,b) suggests, logic trees,
which represent possibilities on branches,
can provide a useful visualization tool
for overcoming such psychological bar-
riers. If one were to draw out the two
possibilities in the Ann problem—one in
which cheater Jack looks at non-cheater
Ann and the other in which cheater Ann
looks at non-cheater George—the correct
answer is evident. If you draw a logic tree
showing the two possibilities (Ann as a
cheater or as a non-cheater) and the “look-
ing relations” that are entailed in each, it
becomes evident that no matter what Ann
is, a cheater will always look at a non-
cheater. Who the cheater is and who the
non-cheater is will differ depending on
whether Ann is a cheater or not, but those
details are irrelevant to the question. The
logic tree also shows that it is impossi-
ble for a non-cheater to look at a cheater.
However, in that case, one must attend to
what is omitted from the set of possible
worlds.
THE SLEEPING BEAUTY PROBLEM
In the remainder of this paper, I explore
the value of logic trees in representing
alternative arguments by experts about
normative belief updating. I focus on
the Sleeping Beauty problem introduced
by Elga (2000) and discussed shortly
thereafter by Lewis (2001). My aim is
twofold: First, I want to show how these
authors’ arguments may be represented
and how the representations may be com-
pared. Second, I want to propose a resolu-
tion of the disagreement over the problem
that I believe is novel.
This is Lewis’s description of the
problem:
Researchers at Experimental Philosophy
Laboratory have decided to carry out
the following experiment. First they will
tell Sleeping Beauty [SB] all that I am
about to tell you in this paragraph, and
they will see to it that she fully believes
all she is told. Then on Sunday evening
they will put her to sleep. On Monday
they will awaken her briefly. At first they
will not tell her what day it is, but later
they will tell her that it is Monday. Then
they will subject her to memory era-
sure. Perhaps they will again awaken
her briefly on Tuesday. Whether they do
will depend on the toss of a fair coin:
if heads they will awaken her only on
Monday, if tails they will awaken her
on Tuesday as well. On Wednesday the
experiment will be over and she will be
allowed to wake up. The three possible
brief awakenings during the experiment
will be indistinguishable: she will have
the same total evidence at her Monday
awakening whatever the result of the
coin toss may be, and if she is awak-
ened on Tuesday the memory erasure on
Monday will make sure that her total
evidence at the Tuesday awakening is
exactly the same as at the Monday awak-
ening. However, she will be able, and she
will be taught how, to distinguish her
brief awakenings during the experiment
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from herWednesday awakening after the
experiment is over, and indeed from all
other actual awakenings there have ever
been, or ever will be.
Furthermore, assume that SB is a paragon
of rationality and let us also assume for
the sake of concreteness that the coin is
tossed on Sunday night after SB is put to
sleep. What subjective probability should
she assign to heads (H) upon her awaken-
ing on Monday, and then again after she is
told that it is Monday?
Elga and Lewis agree that SB will be in
one of three states:
H1: Heads and it is Monday
T1: Tails and it is Monday
T2: Tails and it is Tuesday.
Elga starts out by imagining that SB knows
that the coin lands on tails. Since T1 and
T2 would be indistinguishable to SB, he
argues that she should assign each the
same probability: P(T1) = P(T2) = 1/2.
Next, Elga imagines that SB knows it is
Monday, arguing that SB should assign
equal probability to H1 and T1 given the
fact that the coin is fair. Thus, P(H1)
= P(T1) = P(T2). Since these probabili-
ties must sum to 1, each must equal 1/3.
Therefore, Elga proposes that, on waking
in an asynchronous state, SB should assign
a 1/3 probability to heads, and that she
should revise this probability to 1/2 after
learning it is Monday.
Lewis disagrees. He starts out with the
principle that the subjective probability of
a future chance event should be equal to
the known chances (Mellor, 1971; Lewis,
1980). Since the coin is fair, the known
chances indicate P(H) = P(T) = 1/2.
Lewis argues that on awakening SB has not
learned anything new that would warrant
belief revision. She has no new knowledge
of her location. Like Elga, Lewis accepts
that SB should regard P(T1) = P(T2).
Given P(T) = P(T1 ∨ T2) = 1/2, and the
disjunctive possibilities are equiprobable,
P(T1) = P(T2) = 1/4.
Elga and Lewis agree that, upon
learning it is Monday, SB should increase
her subjective probability of heads by 1/6
after conditionalizing on the remain-
ing possibilities. For Elga, P(H|H1 ∨
T1) = (1/3)/(2/3) = 1/2. For Lewis,
P(H |H1 ∨ T1) = (1/2)/(3/4) = 2/3.
Interestingly, Lewis does not apply his
imaging rule for belief updating (Lewis,
1976) here, even though it arguably applies
(Cozic, 2011; see also Baratgin, 2009).
The SB problem continues to
prompt philosophical debate (e.g., Dorr,
2002; Horgan, 2004; Weintraub, 2004;
Rosenthal, 2009; Baratgin and Walliser,
2010). In my own thinking about it, I
have found it useful to externally visualize
the alternative arguments using enhanced
logic trees that also encode operations
(e.g., normalization) or relation types
(e.g., necessity). Figure 1 shows possible
logic trees for Elga’s “thirder” and Lewis’s
“halfer” positions. It reveals that the locus
of disagreement is in the apportioning of
probability to T1 and T2.
In Elga’s analysis, these two centered
possibilities each have a subjective proba-
bility of 1/2 since the coin toss outcome
T, all agree, equals 1/2 and the Monday
and Tuesday awakenings necessarily fol-
low. Since H1 also equals 1/2, the prob-
abilities must be normalized to constrain
their sum to 1. This leads to each centered
possibility having a probability of 1/3.
In Lewis’s analysis, the same two cen-
tered possibilities, T1 and T2, each have a
subjective probability of 1/4 because Lewis
applies a principle of indifference to them.
Given that the three centered possibilities
are additive, normalization is not required
and H1 remains 1/2.
The visualizations reveal something
about the relative strength of the two posi-
tions, which I believe favors 1/3 as an
answer to the first question. I won’t say
they favor Elga’s arguments over Lewis’s.
That would be reading in too much and
let me come back to that. It seems evi-
dent that the strength of the Elgan tree
over the Lewisian tree is that the for-
mer encodes necessity relations on the
centered branches that follow from the
possible world in which T transpired on
Sunday night, whereas the latter encodes
SB’s uncertainties. We have already seen
what relying on our uncertainties rather
than on what must follow can do in the
Ann problem. I suspect the lesson may
be repeated here but for better reasons.
Lewis keeps P(H1) fixed at 1/2 because
he believes that, given no change in rel-
evant information, there should not be a
change in subjective probability. Since all
agree that P(H) = 1/2, and since nothing
about location is learned upon SB’s awak-
ening, there is a principled reason for not
changing the probabilities. As Lewis notes,
he realizes the appeal of Elga’s argument,
but it is precisely because he finds his own
more principled that he sticks to it. There
is something to be said about following
logic even if it does not lead to intuitive
conclusions, and that appears to be what
Lewis has done.
While Lewis is correctly principled,
both he and Elga mistake what SB’s subjec-
tive probability on Sunday ought to refer
to. Both attribute a subjective probability
of 1/2 to SB on Sunday night before she
is put to sleep. But what exactly does this
probability refer to? Elga and Lewis focus
on P(H), and I believe that is the prob-
lem. One should consider what probability
SB would assign on Sunday to H know-
ing what she knows about the waking rules
of the experiment, and imagining she has
just awoken in an asynchronous state in
the experiment. Let us call this P∗(H1),
where the asterisk denotes the counter-
factual status of the hypothesis. P∗(H1) is
the probability of the Stalnaker-type con-
ditional (Stalnaker, 1968) specified in the
query, “What is the probability that if you,
SB, were to have an asynchronous awak-
ening, then the coin would have come
up heads?” We might expand this query,
which utilizes a wide-scope probability
operator (Over et al., 2013), as follows:
“What is the probability that if you, SB,
were to have an asynchronous awaken-
ing, which in fact you and I know you
are not having at the moment, and if
you knew all that you know now about
the rules of the experiment, then the
coin would have come up heads?” In this
case, the probability she should assign
to P∗(H1) equals 1/3, precisely because
P(H) = P(T) = 1/2, P(Monday awaken-
ing) = 1, and P(Tuesday awakening) =
1/2. Because an asynchronous awakening,
A, must either be a Monday awakening or
a Tuesday awakening, P(A = Monday) =
2/3. P∗(H1) = P(A = Monday)P(H) =
(2/3)(1/2) = 1/3.
That, on Monday, P(H1) should
also equal 1/3 reflects adherence to the
dynamic coherence criterion or Bayesian
conditioning principle, which states that
a probability assessed conditionally on
a suppositional event x should not differ
from the probability assessed conditionally
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on the actual event x (Baratgin and
Politzer, 2006). In the Sleeping Beauty
problem, A may be supposed, contrary
to fact, on Sunday night and A will be
actualized on Monday, and possibly on
Tuesday too.
The mislabeling of the event that SB
is to consider on Sunday night leads Elga
to accept belief revision in the absence of
new relevant information. He arrives at
a correct answer but forfeits a principle
he should have defended. Lewis defends
that principle, but ends up with an incor-
rect estimate because of the initial labeling
error. Elgan thirders are therefore right
about 1/3 and Lewisian halfers are right to
stick to their principles.
Both the Ann and Sleeping Beauty
problems illustrate the value of visual
representations in reasoning through
problems that require people to state their
degree of belief in a given proposition. In
neither case is the problem’s solution clar-
ified by externalizing a natural frequency
representation of the problem. Frequency
trees and other nested-set-revealing
visualizations may facilitate Bayesian
reasoning, but so can other forms of
visualization, such as (enhanced) logic
trees.
The Sleeping Beauty problem also high-
lights the limits of visualization since noth-
ing in the visualizations offered clarifies
the labeling error that I believe lies at the
heart of the disagreement; namely, that
the proposition being assessed changes
from Time 1 (Sunday night) to Time 2
(Monday’s asynchronous awakening). Put
differently, the visualizations shown in
Figure 1 do not represent queries, and it
is at the level of query formulation where
I believe the controversy first arose. Note
too that while the trees in Figure 1 respec-
tively represent Elga’s and Lewis’s stances
on the Sleeping Beauty problem, they do
not inherently resolve which stance is more
appropriate. At best, they might help other
reasoners reach a conclusion by showing
in representational terms where disagree-
ment seems to lie.
If my account is correct, it raises the
question why P∗(H1) could be mistaken
for P(H) by such sharp minds. That it
would—namely, that Sunday’s apples
would be compared with Monday’s
oranges—is both surprising and a con-
tinuing source of my own skepticism in
its correctness. Yet, it seems uncontrover-
sial that (a) Elga, Lewis and indeed most
commentators on the problem focus their
attention on P(H) when considering SB’s
Sunday assessment and (b) that this is not
well paired with the assessments made
upon awakening. To be explicit, the reason
it is not well paired is that on Monday,
SB must take into account the rules of the
experiment, which she perfectly remem-
bers, yet on Sunday she must disregard
that knowledge, which is equally at her
disposal, in giving her simple credence for
heads. Given she is a paragon of rational-
ity, I cannot help but think that she would
object to such inconsistency.
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discussions about the Sleeping Beauty
problem and belief revision.
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